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Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peerdisagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice
Andrew D. Spear
Philosophy Department, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, USA
ABSTRACT

Miranda Fricker has characterized epistemic injustice as “a kind of injustice in
which someone is wronged speciﬁcally in her capacity as a knower” (2007,
Epistemic injustice: Power & the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 20). Gaslighting, where one agent seeks to gain control over another by
undermining the other’s conception of herself as an independent locus of
judgment and deliberation, would thus seem to be a paradigm example. Yet,
in the most thorough analysis of gaslighting to date (Abramson, K. 2014.
“Turning up the lights on gaslighting.” Philosophical Perspectives 28, Ethics: 1–
30), the idea that gaslighting has crucial epistemic dimensions is rather
roundly rejected on grounds that gaslighting works by means of a strategy of
assertion and manipulation that is not properly understood in epistemic
terms. I argue that Abramson’s focus on the gaslighter and on the moral
wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters
nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less
attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim, for whom
the experience of gaslighting has substantial and essential epistemic features.
Taking these features into account reveals that all gaslighting has epistemic
dimensions and helps to clarify what resistance to gaslighting might look like.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 1 August 2018; Accepted 1 February 2019
KEYWORDS Gaslighting; epistemic self-Trust; self-Trust; peer-Disagreement; epistemic injustice

In this essay I argue that gaslighting has essential epistemic dimensions.
Gaslighters can oﬀer their victims straightforward (if fabricated) epistemic
reasons as part of the gaslighting process, and every gaslighter makes at
least a tacit claim to a position of epistemic superiority relative to his
victim, one that plays a role in the victim’s experience of gaslighting.
From the victim’s standpoint, gaslighting calls into question not just her
moral or psychological, but also her epistemic self-trust: her conception
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of herself as an independent locus of experience, thought, and judgment.1
Because the victim trusts both herself and her gaslighter, his challenge to
her self-trust generates, from her standpoint, a situation of epistemic peerdisagreement where what she and her gaslighter disagree about is speciﬁcally her own epistemic standing, and so her entitlement to epistemic selftrust. In this connection I discuss the conditions under which it is reasonable
for someone to accept defeat for their own epistemic self-trust (and so to
conciliate in the disagreement with the gaslighter), and argue that these
conditions are particularly pertinent to understanding the situation of the
victim of gaslighting as well as what well-grounded resistance to gaslighting
might look like. In stressing the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting I diﬀer
from the analysis of the issue oﬀered by Kate Abramson (2014), even while
following her account closely in other respects.
Section 1 introduces the phenomenon of gaslighting by means of
examples, and discusses Abramson’s analysis of gaslighting. Section 2 outlines Abramson’s reasons for downplaying the role of epistemic factors in
gaslighting, while Section 3 begins a response to these by discussing epistemic dimensions of gaslighting on the side of the gaslighter. Sections 4
and 5 focus on the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting as experienced
by the victim, while section 6 considers the implications of the account
oﬀered here for resistance to gaslighting.

1. The gaslighting phenomenon and Abramson’s analysis
The term ‘gaslighting’ derives from Patrick Hamilton’s 1938 play Gas Light
and from the 1944 ﬁlm of the same name starring Charles Boyer and Ingrid
Bergman. In the early 1980s the term became the center of some discussion in psychoanalysis (Calef and Weinshel 1981), and it has since been
picked up in the realms of self-help (Stern 2007) and political commentary
(Carpenter 2018). While no treatment of the topic is likely to accommodate
all of these diﬀerent uses, Kate Abramson has provided a thorough philosophical analysis of gaslighting and of its moral wrongness (Abramson
2014). While accurate and illuminating in many ways, Abramson’s
1

Here and throughout I use ‘she’, ‘her’, etc. to refer to the victim of gaslighting and ‘he’, ‘his’, etc. to refer to
the perpetrator. This usage helps to avoid pronoun-confusion throughout, and ﬁts with the situations in
key examples of gaslighting (the ﬁlms Gas Light and Pat and Mike) and with the feminist slant of Abramson’s 2014 analysis of the phenomenon. In adopting this usage, I do not mean to take a stand concerning
whether gaslighting is particularly or predominantly perpetrated by men against women. I think that the
agent and patient of gaslighting can be mixed in any number of ways in terms of gender (men to
women, men to men, women to men, etc.) and other social relations. Who gaslights who predominantly
or the most, in terms of social category, is an empirical question that I expect depends rather heavily on
social and cultural factors.
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account focuses on the role of manipulation in gaslighting while downplaying epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons. I
think, however, that these latter are equally essential to a complete understanding of the phenomenon. In this section I will discuss two paradigm
examples of gaslighting and introduce Abramson’s account.
1.1. Two central examples of gaslighting
Abramson begins her discussion by introducing a variety of cases that are
plausibly considered gaslighting. I’ll consider two of these here in order to
frame the discussion.
First, there is the case presented in the 1944 ﬁlm Gas Light. In the ﬁlm,
Paula (Ingrid Bergman) is the victim of gaslighting on the part of her
husband Gregory (Charles Boyer). Unbeknownst to herself, Paula is in possession of priceless jewels that belonged to her aunt, a famous opera
singer who was mysteriously murdered when Paula was a young girl.
Gregory, who is in fact the murderer of Paula’s aunt and single-mindedly
bent on gaining possession of the jewels, romances and marries Paula in
Italy, then convinces her to return to London to live in her aunt’s old house.
Gregory is conﬁdent the jewels are in the attic of the house and ‘goes out
on business often’ in order to secretly go to the attic by a back staircase to
search for the jewels. His use of the gaslights in the attic causes the gaslight in the rest of the house to go dim. Paula sees this, and often hears
mysterious footsteps in the attic. Gregory not only assures her that she
is imagining things, but from the beginning suggests to her that she is
overtired, and that her memory is not working properly. He subtly arranges
things so that it appears, to Paula and others around her, that she has been
stealing, hiding, or moving things around in the house. Of course, when he
confronts Paula with these things, she has no recollection of having done
them, which only conﬁrms Gregory’s ‘suspicion’ of her faulty memory and
imagining of things. As a result, Paula’s conﬁdence in her own judgment
and mental faculties dramatically deteriorates. Gregory’s goal is to drive
her to the point where she believes that she is mad so that he can get
her out of the way and have the house to himself to search for the
jewels. The ‘gaslighting’ in the ﬁlm is Gregory’s attempt to convince Paula
not to trust her own judgment and faculties, and so not to trust herself.
The second case, one that plays a central role in Abramson’s analysis, is
also from a ﬁlm. This time from the 1952 Film Pat and Mike. In the ﬁlm Pat is
an aspiring female golfer, while her ﬁancée Collier wants (tacitly at least)
for her to give up her golf career so that they can get married and she
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can assume the wifely duties of household and children. After a close tournament loss in which Collier’s less than supportive approach has played a
clear (to the viewer) but not explicit role, Pat and Collier have the following
exchange:
Collier

Pat (distressed)
Collier (interrupting Pat)
Pat (determinedly, upset)
Collier
Pat
Collier
Pat (quite distressed)

Collier
Pat (fatigued)
Collier
Pat
Collier

How about looking on the bright side of this for
instance? Take this—As long as your job’s out of
the way, move the date up, tie the old knot? I
think you’ve done enough, worked long
enough, don’t you?
oh, too much (looks down)
After all, what you trying to prove, who you
trying to lick?
Myself. (pounds ﬁst in air)
Just the kid who’ll do it (Puts his leg up and looks
at her dubiously and patronizingly)
Collier, do you sort of, I don’t think you mean to,
but do you think of me as just the little woman?
That’s right, and myself as a little man. (Squeezes
her shoulders like a small child).
Right now, now I feel like a sort of ﬂop that
you’re rescuing. I’m ﬂummoxed, that’s what I
am. Maybe we ought to wait until I don’t feel
so carved up, so nobody.
Why don’t you just let me take charge!
I have to be in charge of myself.
Oh what’s the good of that, I mean after all?
I have to have time to think it over.
Well, just make sure you don’t think it under. It’s
a nice long ride, just take your time. (Opens
newspaper to end conversation). (The screenplay for Pat and Mike, quoted in Abramson
2014, 7)

In this case, and in many of the cases Abramson focuses on, the
gaslighting is more subtle than in the case of Paula and Gregory, but
has a similar goal. What Collier wants is for Pat to stop resisting his
vision of their future together, even if that vision essentially involves
that she give up on projects that are important to her. He aims to
achieve this both by calling into question, however subtly, her ability to
manage things for herself (‘I think you’ve done enough, worked long
enough, don’t you? … .Just the kid who’ll do it … ’), and also by tacitly
communicating to her the possibility of his emotional withdrawal and
so of her loss of the relationship with him if she doesn’t see things his
way (‘Well, just make sure you don’t think it under’ followed by the
abrupt ending of the conversation). As in Gas Light, so here, we have
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the gaslighter attempting to undermine his victim’s conﬁdence in herself,
and so to break down her resistance and get her to endorse his plans,
decisions, and view of reality rather than her own.
1.2. Abramson on gaslighting
On the basis of the foregoing and similar examples, Abramson argues that
gaslighters are individuals who cannot tolerate even the possibility of disagreement with or criticism of their way of viewing things, at least not
from certain individuals (friends, loved ones, romantic partners …), and
that the purpose of gaslighting is not only to neutralize particular criticisms
that such individuals might lodge, but to neutralize the very possibility of criticism by undermining the victim’s conception of herself as an autonomous
locus of thought, judgement, and action. Even when the strategy is subtle
and manipulative, what the gaslighter really wants, and so what gaslighting
centrally involves, is to undermine his victim’s capacity to criticize or
respond independently of him. Abramson’s analysis of gaslighting is that,
… he [the gaslighter] aims to destroy the possibility of disagreement by so radically undermining another person that she has nowhere left to stand from which
to disagree, no standpoint from which her words might constitute genuine disagreement. (2014, 10)

Thus,
… the paradigm case of gaslighting..[is] … one in which the gaslighter wholeheartedly, constantly and consistently aims at the destruction [of] his or her
target’s standing to issue challenges … (2014, 11)

On Abramson’s view, gaslighting essentially involves manipulation. It
involves (i) issuing a demand to the victim (ultimately, that she accept
the gaslighter’s assessment of herself and ‘see things his way’) where (ii)
the victim’s ‘motive for assent’ to the demand comes in the form of implicit
or explicit ‘manipulative threats’ on the part of the gaslighter. Thus, Collier’s demand to Pat is that she accept that she is not seeing the situation
properly or need not worry about seeing the situation properly since, after
all, he can; and that further, if she fails to see the situation properly then he
may end the relationship (2014, 15). While Abramson does not stress the
point, her analysis makes it clear that gaslighter and victim will typically
stand in a signiﬁcant relationship of trust or authority, such that the
gaslighter is able to leverage speciﬁc interests of his victim either in
him, in their relationship, or in her social or economic situation that can
motivate her compliance.

6

A. D. SPEAR

2. Abramson against an epistemic reading of gaslighting
Abramson is throughout critical of the view that there is a signiﬁcant epistemic dimension to gaslighting. She points out that the gaslighter is not
primarily (or at all) ‘ … trying to get a person to rethink her reactions, or
to see another perspective’ (2014, 13), and that many of the typical
retorts of the gaslighter take the form of directives or proclamations:
‘don’t be paranoid’ and ‘that’s crazy’ are blunt assertions, not invitations
to further discussion. Further, Abramson suggests that if the gaslighter is
challenged by his victim, he does not respond by engaging any evidence
she might provide, but rather by broadening or intensifying his declarative
attack on his victim’s capacities, motives, and limitations, ﬁnally resorting
to tacit or explicit manipulation if the victim persists in her challenges.
Further on, in the heart of her discussion of gaslighting as manipulation,
Abramson says,
… he [the gaslighter] isn’t in the ﬁrst instance claiming for himself a epistemic
authority (I see this rightly, you don’t) … what he’s doing is issuing a demand
that one see things his way … this isn’t a case of, for instance, testimonial credence (i.e. the gaslighter isn’t asking his/her target to take it on testimony
that it’s true that “that’s crazy”). If that were the scenario, there’d be no explanation for the gaslighter’s use of manipulative threats (implicit or explicit). It’s
the explicit or implicit manipulative threats … that give the target anything
like motive for assent. (2014, 15)

Similarly, Abramson is critical of the idea that gaslighting is productively
understood as what Miranda Fricker has called ‘testimonial injustice’.
According to Fricker, such injustice occurs when a speaker’s word suffers
a loss in credibility for the hearer due to identity prejudice (Fricker 2007,
28). For example, if a white jury member does not give the testimony of
an African American witness the credence that it deserves in a courtroom
due to the fact that the juror is prejudiced against African Americans.
Abramson responds,
To suppose that in gaslighting, the primary issue is about credibility assessments is, I think, to focus in the wrong place. It’s to lose sight of the fact
that an important part of what’s going on is that the gaslighter is trying to
turn a situation that might involve credibility assessments into a situation in
which credibility assessments are not at issue, because there is no credibility
to be assessed. (2014, 17)

While I am in agreement with much of Abramson’s analysis of gaslighting,
on the issue of credence and the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting I
think that she is too quick to be dismissive.
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3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter’s gaslighting2
I agree that a necessary condition for gaslighting is that the gaslighter
have the goal of ‘ … destroying his or her target’s standing to issue challenges … ’ (2014, 11). Further, and here I think Abramson would agree,
what it means to ‘destroy’ another person’s standing to issue challenges,
in the context of gaslighting, is speciﬁcally to bring it about that the
other person views herself as deﬁcient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret situations, think, and choose for
herself. It would be possible to ‘destroy’ another’s standing to issue challenges by simply killing them, or administering mind-controlling drugs, or
undermining her credibility with others in relevant social contexts, but the
gaslighter wants more than this: he is speciﬁcally out to achieve a change
of attitude in his victim towards herself.
If this is the goal of gaslighting, however, then the following seems at
least possible: the gaslighter’s motivation for gaslighting could be the
simple desire to gain total or near total control over the victim, while
the strategy for achieving this end could be to leverage the victim’s
trust in him as a credible peer or authority and to provide her with a selective, carefully constructed, or outright manipulated set of evidence in
order to convince her that she is indeed unable to handle all or most cognitive and deliberative functions on her own. On this model, the victim’s
acquiescence would be a consequence of her (from a third-person omniscient standpoint, clearly misplaced) trust in the gaslighter, and of the particular array of evidence or arguments (to whatever degree actually
fabricated) that the gaslighter has provided. Abramson suggests that if
this is what the gaslighter were doing, then there would be no explanation
for the use of ‘manipulative threats’ by the gaslighter, and no account of
the victim’s ‘motive for assenting’. Yet manipulative threats could certainly
play a role in clouding the ability of the victim to properly assess the
gaslighter’s credibility and the quality of the reasons that he oﬀers, and
Abramson does not explain why straightforward epistemic reasons
couldn’t provide the victim with a motive for assent, especially since the
‘assent’ at issue is speciﬁcally supposed to be a change in belief about
herself, not merely a change in behavior.
To develop this point, in typical cases of gaslighting the gaslighter
wants the victim to accept his views about two things. First and foremost,
he is attempting to convince her that she should not trust herself: that she
2

Versions of the arguments of Sections 3 and 4 ﬁrst appeared in a briefer form in (Spear 2018).
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is ‘crazy’ or ‘oversensitive’, that her grasp of the situation is too defective
for her to make reliable judgments about it, or that her judgments themselves can’t be trusted. Second, there is typically also a speciﬁc further
claim that the victim is supposed to accept: that she has been moving
things around in the apartment and then forgetting, or that Pat should
give up her career and marry Collier. The gaslighter thus, arguably, has a
twofold project. There is the ongoing project of getting his victim to
accept that she is, in general, not competent to make certain (or most)
kinds of judgments and so should not trust herself, and then there is
the appeal to the results of this project as a sort of premise to compel compliance or ward oﬀ critique from the victim on particular occasions. On
Abramson’s view, gaslighting is only happening if the gaslighter attempts
to motivate his victim to accept these attitudes toward herself and what he
wants by means of manipulation. Yet, as already suggested, it seems clear
that gaslighting at least can be about the epistemic status of the gaslighter
and about giving the victim primarily epistemic reasons to distrust her
own experience and judgment. This is precisely the scenario of Gregory
and Paula in the 1944 ﬁlm. It is because Paula trusts Gregory as a reliable
judge of how things are, and because he then systematically manufactures
plausible evidence that her faculties are untrustworthy, that she is brought
to the point where she is no longer conﬁdent in her own judgments. This
doesn’t preclude his use of more manipulative appeals to Paula’s emotions
and insecurities, but even when the reasons he gives her are purely (fabricated) epistemic ones, I see no reason to say that what he is doing isn’t
gaslighting.
The point just made about Paula’s trust in Gregory is crucial, however,
for it indicates a broader respect in which all gaslighting involves issues
of epistemic status and trust. Whether the gaslighter challenges his
victim’s self-trust primarily manipulatively, by playing upon her
emotional commitments or insecurities, primarily epistemically (by
oﬀering reasons or relying on his perceived credibility), or by means
of some mix of these two strategies (probably the typical case), his
gaslighting eﬀorts can gain purchase only if the victim trusts him, and
an essential part of this trust must, I argue, be epistemic. He maintains,
after all, that she is incapable of seeing and so responding to the situation properly, and thus that she should trust him rather than her
own grasp of what is going on. However, to say to someone that they
fail to see a situation correctly, whether calmly and quietly, or abruptly
and unpleasantly (as the gaslighter frequently does: ‘that’s crazy’ or
‘that’s just what you would think’) is to tacitly claim to see that same
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situation at least somewhat better. Even if he doesn’t say it in just these
terms (and even if he is not sincere), by making the assertions that he
does concerning his victim’s grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is,
contra Abramson, by this very fact laying claim to a special or privileged
epistemic status relative to his victim. Another way to see this, I think, is
that were the victim to seriously doubt the epistemic status (the credibility) of her gaslighter, this fact would itself render his gaslighting
project unworkable. If the victim interprets the gaslighter’s abrupt and
aggressive behavior as indicative of some (ultimately epistemic) failure
to properly see the situation on his part, rather than as arising from a
failing of her own, then he may still be able to manipulate her behavior,
but he will not be successful in actually changing her own assessment of
herself, in gaslighting her.
Thus, insincere though he typically will be, I think the gaslighter’s assertions do involve claims to epistemic status relative to his victim, at least
tacit ones. I do not know if this is so ‘in the ﬁrst instance’ as Abramson
says it is not, but I do think it is an essential element of all gaslighting
behavior. Indeed, part of the reason I think this is precisely because credibility assessments of this sort are relevant to the victim’s ‘motive to assent’.
While I agree with Abramson that the gaslighter will typically also be
manipulating his victim, I think the victim only has motivation to assent
to change her beliefs about her own grasp of the situation if she takes the
gaslighter to have an epistemically credible grasp of the situation. The
gaslighter could convince her to accept this assessment of himself
either in the explicitly epistemic fashion of Gregory in Gas Light or by
deploying manipulative threats, as does Collier in Pat and Mike, but in
both cases the credibility assessment itself plays a crucial part in the
gaslighting process. Finally, while I agree also that the gaslighter is
trying to ‘ … turn a situation that might involve credibility assessments
into a situation in which credibility assessments are not at issue,
because there is no credibility to be assessed’ (Abramson 2014, 17), so
long as this means speciﬁcally getting the victim to change her mind
about her assessment of her own credibility, her assessment of his credibility is an essential element of the process (a point I will develop in
more detail in the next section). Finally, whether the gaslighter is speciﬁcally committing testimonial injustice against his victim, his attempt to
undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent
surely is an attempt to wrong her ‘speciﬁcally in her capacity as a
knower’, and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker’s sense of
this term (Fricker 2007, 20).
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Thus, while Abramson’s view of gaslighting as manipulation based on
aﬀective and prudential vulnerabilities of the victim captures many important aspects of gaslighting and helps to draw out the nature of the wrong
it involves, her insistence that issues of epistemic reasons, credibility
assessments, and testimony play little or no role in gaslighting seems mistaken. Even when viewed solely from the standpoint of the gaslighter,
gaslighting can have an epistemic dimension insofar as the gaslighter’s
strategy may be overtly epistemic (as in the case of Gregory in Gas
Light), while all gaslighting has an essential epistemic dimension insofar
as the overt assertion that someone else does not grasp a situation properly always involves the tacit assertion that the speaker (the gaslighter in
this case) does see the situation at least somewhat better, and so should
be trusted. I will develop this point about trust on the side of the victim in
the next section.

4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the
epistemology of disagreement
For the victim of gaslighting, the fundamental issue she confronts when
experiencing gaslighting has to do with self-trust. The gaslighter’s goal is
to convince his victim that her thoughts, perceptions, memories, judgments, and evaluations of the situation are so unreliable that she
should put little or no credence in their deliverances, and should
instead see things as he sees them. Self-trust is, roughly, the tacit or
explicit belief that a relevant subset of one’s cognitive faculties (e.g.
one’s perceptual faculties, reasoning, memory, etc.) are in general
aimed at the production of true beliefs (accurate inferences, etc.), that
these faculties are functioning properly, and that one’s assessments of
their deliverances are in general and on the whole correct (veridical perceptions and accurate inferences would matter little if the subject nevertheless put these together in random or incoherent ways to form beliefs
about situations and about the world). For my purposes here two claims
about epistemic self-trust are important. The ﬁrst is that it is default
rational to have self-trust concerning one’s own cognitive faculties and
judgments. Subjects don’t need to be in possession of special reasons
or arguments in order to be justiﬁed in trusting themselves. The
second is that self-trust is nevertheless defeasible. While subjects do
not need special reasons to trust themselves, there are types of
reason a subject could confront that might require them to suspend
judgment in or even give up their self-trust.
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Linda Zagzebski has recently presented a view of self-trust as basic,
natural, and rational, but also defeasible. According to Zagzebski, there is
a natural pre-reﬂective desire to have true beliefs and a natural belief
that this desire is in general satisﬁable, where these two things combined
‘imply that there is also a pre-reﬂective trust in the suitableness of one’s
cognitive faculties for arriving at truth’ (2012, 36). While this self-trust is
pre-reﬂective, Zagzebski argues that reﬂective self-trust arises as a result
of the confrontation with various skeptical possibilities, and of the realization that any attempt to justify belief in the trustworthiness of one’s cognitive faculties and standpoint will ultimately be circular. There is no noncircular way to show or demonstrate to one’s self that one’s cognitive faculties are reliable.
Further, Zagzebski understands rationality in a particular way as ‘doing
what we naturally do better’. On her view, we naturally desire true beliefs,
and part of this desire involves using our reason to minimize or eliminate
cognitive dissonance when our beliefs seem to be inconsistent either with
each other or with new evidence provided by our faculties. Zagzebski
argues, in eﬀect, that the most rational thing for the reﬂective self to do
after the confrontation with skepticism and the realization of the epistemic
circularity involved in any attempt at bootstrapping epistemic self-trust, is
to reﬂectively double-down on the natural self-trust of the pre-reﬂective
self. Self-trust is thus natural, unavoidable if one is going to pursue truth
at all, and rational by Zagzebski’s understanding of rational, yet it is defeasible: ‘ … if we regularly had inconsistent memories or unstable perceptions, we would know that something was amiss with these faculties;
they could not be trusted’ (2012, 41). In what follows, I will rely on Zagzebski’s account of self-trust in particular in order to more closely analyze the
epistemic nature of the situation of the victim of gaslighting.
If the goal of the gaslighter is to undermine his victim’s self-trust in a
global way (so as to undermine her ability to meaningfully criticize him
and/or to gain control over her), then the victim’s experience of gaslighting must be one in which the default and even reﬂective rationality of her
self-trust is meaningfully and quite globally challenged. So, what might
such a challenge look like? The answer, I think, is that the gaslighter
begins the process of gaslighting by introducing cognitive dissonance,
often quite emotionally charged cognitive dissonance, into the relationship with his victim, dissonance that speciﬁcally requires the victim to
decide between her own way of viewing things and that of the gaslighter,
and the gaslighter then works directly or indirectly to ensure that the
victim resolves the dissonance in his favor, speciﬁcally by downgrading
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her conception of herself as a locus of independent thought and judgment
relative to him. More speciﬁcally, from the standpoint of the victim of
gaslighting, the experience is that of epistemic peer-disagreement of
the sort dealt with in recent discussions in epistemology, but with a twist.
Two individuals are epistemic peers if they are approximately equal in
their informedness, reasoning abilities, freedom from bias, and other cognitive performance and judgement-relevant factors. The central question
in recent discussions of epistemic peer disagreement in epistemology
has been that of what the rational thing to do is when two individuals
who take themselves to be epistemic peers disagree about some proposition, whether something simple such as the correct splitting of a
shared dinner check, or something more controversial such as a political
or moral question. Does the mere fact of such disagreement, keeping all
other evidence constant, constitute grounds for the individuals involved
in the disagreement to adjust their credence in their respective beliefs
downward (the ‘conciliationist’ position) or not (the ‘steadfast’ position)
(see e.g. Christensen 2009)? The idea of an epistemic peer naturally
suggests the idea of both an epistemic superior (or epistemic authority)
and an epistemic inferior. It is not diﬃcult to imagine someone attempting
to resolve apparent peer-disagreement by down-grading their interlocutor, by revoking her status as epistemic peer and so the claim of her opposing belief to serious rational consideration. A slight variation on this would
be to attempt to gain concessions from or control over one’s interlocutor
by convincing her that she herself is not one’s epistemic peer in some signiﬁcant respect. I take this move to be a central element in gas-lighting:
the gas-lighter attempts to gain concessions from his victim by reducing
her, by her own lights, to an epistemic inferior or dependent.
More to the point, and this is the ‘twist’ on ordinary peer-disagreement
that I suggested above, what the gaslighter does is make the question of
the reliability of his victim’s cognitive faculties (her ability to grasp, interpret, and correctly judge the situation) itself the proposition about
which they disagree. This places the victim in a very diﬃcult epistemic situation because she must weigh her trust in her own epistemic agency
against her trust in the gaslighter as an epistemic peer, bearing in mind
that his calling into question of her cognitive faculties arguably provides
at least some defeating evidence for her epistemic self-trust, evidence
that she cannot reject in a non-circular fashion (Christenson 2009, 760).
However, the debate between the conciliationist and steadfast positions
gets resolved, it would be very diﬃcult to deny that there are some
cases where it is rational for a subject to take the word of a trusted
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friend, acquaintance, or authority as grounds that her cognitive faculties
are malfunctioning. For instance, a close friend might inform one that
one has been misremembering things often lately, and that this may
well be a sign of approaching Alzheimer’s. From the victim’s standpoint,
I suggest, gaslighting often mimics such cases. The victim ﬁnds herself
confronted with a situation where she must weigh her epistemic selftrust (her trust in her abilities to perceive, reason, and form beliefs adequately) against her trust in the testimony and assertions of an epistemic
peer or authority, where it is her epistemic agency itself that is being called
into question.
Thus, from the standpoint of the victim of gaslighting, gaslighting is a
profoundly epistemic phenomenon having to do both with questions of
epistemic self-trust and with the issue of epistemic peer- or even authoritydisagreement. Whether the gaslighter proceeds according to a strategy of
assertion and manipulation (as in the example of Collier in Pat and Mike) or
according to a more overtly epistemic strategy of manipulatively providing
false but misleading evidence to his victim (as in the example of Gregory
from Gas Light), what the victim ﬁnds herself confronted with is a challenge to her epistemic self-trust being lodged by a person she views as
a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority. If she revokes her epistemic
self-trust, then she can maintain her view of the gaslighter as a typically
sincere epistemic peer or authority. If she revokes her view of the gaslighter as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority, then she can retain
her epistemic self-trust. Yet, the cognitive dissonance created by the
gaslighter means that she can’t do both, even as she may have very
strong emotional and prudential reasons (of the sort discussed insightfully
and at length by Abramson 2014, 18–23) to concede to the gaslighter. It is
only by recognizing the essentially epistemic nature of the victim’s situation, however, that we can fully appreciate the quandary she faces and
the options available to her, and this is an essential part of understanding
both gaslighting and what successful resistance to it might look like. An
important question remains, however, and this is the question of when
or under what conditions the victim is justiﬁed in resisting or in capitulating to gaslighting?

5. The victim of gaslighting: reasons and self-trust-undermining
reasons
I take it that reasons can cause beliefs and motivate actions, and reasons
for both belief and for action can be better or worse, more or less justiﬁed:
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acting for good reasons makes an agent count, all things being equal, as
rational. The class of reasons is not, however, homogenous, as there are
arguably prudential reasons, moral reasons, epistemic reasons, aesthetic
reasons, and etc. The ﬁnal question that I want to consider here is that
of when, or on the basis of what reasons, it is justiﬁed for the victim of
gaslighting to resist her gaslighter (when is it reasonable to treat the
gaslighter’s behavior as a reason to downgrade trust in him rather than
in one’s self?) and when it is not. The question at issue is thus that of
when or under what conditions it would be reasonable for a subject to
believe that her own cognitive agency had been compromised and thus
that she should no longer trust herself to perceive, think, and judge independently. My suggestion here is that belief in one’s own epistemic
agency, one’s epistemic self-trust, is special. While there may be beliefs
that it is acceptable to hold for pragmatic, prudential, or moral reasons
even though one lacks good epistemic reasons for them, and while there
may be beliefs that it is acceptable to abandon for similar reasons and
in spite of lacking good epistemic defeaters, belief in one’s own epistemic
agency is not among these beliefs. What this means is that gaslighting has
yet another epistemic dimension. Namely, the victim who capitulates to
the gaslighter and cedes her self-trust for any reasons other than legitimate epistemic ones, when not doing so is within her power, is violating
what I suggest is a basic epistemic norm.
5.1. Epistemic reasons and prudential reasons
That there are diﬀerent things we care about and so diﬀerent kinds of
reasons for action is a relatively common assumption in recent and even
not so recent philosophy. Call an epistemic reason a reason that makes
beliefs based on it more likely to be true. I take epistemic reasons to be
the kinds of reasons that, when possessed to a suﬃcient degree by a
subject, typically confer epistemic justiﬁcation on her beliefs (BonJour
2003, Ch. 1; Bergmann 2006, Ch. 1). Similarly, and perhaps most importantly here, I take epistemic reasons to be the kinds of reasons that comprise defeaters for belief. A subject S has a defeater D for belief in the
proposition P just in case D makes it all things considered likely that P is
false (a ‘rebutting defeater’) or D undermines S’s original reason for believing that P (an ‘undercutting defeater’) (Pollock 1986; Plantinga 1993,
Ch. 12). A subject who believes that the French Revolution began in
1778 (sparked oﬀ, as he believes, by the untimely death of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau) and then is told by a renowned historian and expert on the
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French Revolution that it in fact began in 1789 receives a rebutting defeater for his belief. He should now think it is false that the French Revolution
began in 1778. A subject who believes that the French Revolution began in
1778 because she read it on a particular website, and then receives information that the website in question is riddled with errors and so untrustworthy, has an undercutting defeater for her belief. She has reason to be
agnostic about the truth of ‘the French Revolution began in 1778’ (assuming the website was her only source of information about this). Epistemic
reasons, including defeaters, provide subjects with reasons for thinking
that a proposition is true (or false) independently of what they wish or
desire to be the case. For example, a forlorn liberal in the United States
who followed the 2016 Election results November eighth and ninth of
that year on a series of credible news sources had strong epistemic
reasons for believing that Donald Trump would be the next President of
the United States, regardless of what they desired or judged was best.
Given this understanding of epistemic reason, a person can be said to
be epistemically rational if they proportion their beliefs to the epistemic
reasons or evidence that they possess.
By contrast with an epistemic reason, call a prudential reason a reason
that some individual has for desiring or wanting a state of aﬀairs to be
the case. A subject has a prudential reason when something would be
‘good for’ her: it would enhance her actual or perceived well-being, at
least to some extent (Crisp 2008, Sec. 1; Taylor 2013). I take it that prudential reasons are ﬁrst and foremost reasons for acting. If Fred has left
his laundry on the line and does not want it to get (or remain) wet, he
has a prudential reason to go out and take it down ahead of the coming
thunder storm. Taking the laundry down is good for him because he
won’t have to expend the eﬀort to dry it a second time. If Sally
aspires to be a talented concert pianist, she has prudential reasons to
practice every day and to seek admission to a high-quality conservatory
for training. This would be good for her. I take it that there can also be
prudential reasons for holding beliefs. If a subject has a prudential
reason for holding a belief, this just means that it would be ‘good’ or
‘better’ for her to hold the belief than not. All things being equal, it is
arguably good for most subjects to believe that they are going to live
past tomorrow, that their spouses are faithful, that their conceptions
of themselves as persons are approximately accurate to how they actually are, and that the rainy weather will not be perpetual. A subject is
then prudentially rational if they act (or form beliefs) in a way that is
all things considered ‘good for’ them.
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While holding true beliefs will, I think, often be prudentially rational
such that epistemic rationality and prudential rationality will align,
there is no reason this must always be the case and I suspect it often
is not.3 William Cliﬀord’s famous dictum that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuﬃcient evidence’
(Cliﬀord 1877/1886/1877/1886) suggests that the only reasons governing
the rationality of belief are epistemic reasons. William James, in part
responding to Cliﬀord, argued that we should not be so restrictive,
and that our so-called ‘passional nature’ might be entitled to base doxastic commitments, at least under certain conditions involving high
stakes values such as religious beliefs or the meaning of life (what
James calls ‘genuine options’) even where no evidence is present: thus
beliefs without epistemic reasons can be rational since they are based
on other kinds of reasons (James 1896/2010/1896/2010). More
mundane cases seem to oﬀer a similar lesson. In some contexts, such
as sports, believing that one’s abilities are greater than they are, even
in the face of evidence to the contrary, may actually have a positive
inﬂuence on performance. Similarly, in the context of health and
disease, it may be the case that believing against the epistemically available odds that one will recover has positive beneﬁts, such as making
one’s illness more bearable or increasing one’s chances of recovery
(Feldman 2003, 43–44). Further, trust is arguably an important value in
interpersonal relationships, yet it may be harmful or even contradictory
to insist that one’s trust, e.g. in one’s spouse’s faithfulness, be fully or
adequately supported by epistemic reasons or evidence (McLeod
2015). Further, it may be that the underdetermination of theory by evidence in science means that much scientiﬁc theory choice is, in part, an
expression of social, evaluative, or aesthetic reasons on the part of scientists, and so not purely epistemic (Kuhn 1977), and this may even extend
to the majority of our extra-scientiﬁc epistemic practices and judgments
(Jaggar 1989). Thus, there are many ways in which epistemic reasons
and prudential reasons might come apart or come into conﬂict for a
given subject.

3

Resolving the issue is in any case beyond the scope of this essay. A strict Aristotelian view of well-being
may well be one on which prudential rationality and epistemic rationality strictly align, while a subjective-preference-satisfaction view of well-being is, I think, likely to lead to divergence between prudential
rationality and epistemic rationality. Whatever account of well-being is accepted, phenomena such as
confabulation and self-deception seem to point rather clearly to ways in which epistemic rationality
and prudential rationality of belief can come apart (Mele 2002; Hirstein 2009; Sullivan-Bissett 2015).
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5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for
epistemic self-trust
For my purposes here, I am willing to concede all of the foregoing and will not
even make much eﬀort to distinguish amongst the diﬀerent points just
reviewed. What I want to argue is that, however the foregoing points get
worked out, one’s epistemic agency and so epistemic self-trust are distinctive
in relation to all of the cases discussed so far in that it is not possible to form
any rational beliefs for any reasons whatsoever if one does not ﬁrst believe in
one’s basic ability to evaluate reasons and form beliefs in response to them. If
an agent accepts that her cognitive faculties, perceptions, judgments, and
overall grasp of her own situation are all substantially deﬁcient, then she is
no longer in a position to endorse as rational, under any understanding of
‘rational’, the judgements she arrives at, and so is no longer able to meaningfully go forward as an agent. Not only is she not in a position to trust her
purely epistemic judgements about the way the world is or about how
likely a given proposition is to be true, but she will be unable to meaningfully
trust her prudential and evaluative judgments as well insofar as these too are
products of the cognitive faculties that she has accepted are broadly malfunctioning or untrustworthy. Yet this is exactly what the gaslighter wants
his victim to do, to cease believing that she is an autonomous locus of
thought, deliberation, and belief. If he is successful in this project, then his
victim will no longer be even a potential source of criticism or resistance to
him, and he will have nearly total control over her.
Given the inquiry-ending and agency-undermining consequences of
accepting such a belief about one’s self, my argument here is that the following is a basic epistemic norm concerning defeat for one’s own epistemic self-trust:
It is rational for an agent to accept that her epistemic agency is globally undermined only for epistemic reasons.

In particular, an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust for prudential reasons, such as desiring to avoid negative personal or professional
consequences, or the desire to maintain an intimate relationship or friendship. Because comprehensively ceding self-trust undermines one’s very
ability to meaningfully be concerned with prudential reasons to begin
with, no merely prudential reason should count, from an agent’s own
standpoint, as a reason sufﬁcient for giving it up.
Epistemic self-trust is, as discussed above, default and reﬂectively
rational to have, but it is subject to defeat. That defeat, I am arguing
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here, must however take the form of legitimate epistemic defeat, not
merely involve an agent giving up on her self-trust for moral or prudential
reasons. None of this implies that it can never be rational to concede that
one’s epistemic agency is compromised. It is typical for patients suﬀering
from certain kinds of neurological or cognitive disorders not to be fully
aware of this fact about themselves (Hirstein 2009, introduction).
However, if such a person is confronted with diagnoses (e.g. of the early
stages of Alzheimer’s disease) from credentialed doctors that are also corroborated by trusted friends or family members who are able to bring to
the agent’s attention particular examples of their own recent behavior that
further corroborate the diagnosis, I think that such an individual is being
confronted with signiﬁcant reasons to doubt her epistemic self-trust.
Even here, the distrust should be carefully proportioned to the extent of
the cognitive malfunction for which the agent has some evidence, but it
would be epistemically arrogant not to take such considerations into
account. It is true that a gaslighter who uses what I have called an ‘epistemic strategy’ of gaslighting, may well try to mimic precisely such an evidential situation (as does Gregory for Paula in the ﬁlm Gas Light), but
this just highlights the point that our epistemic agency, while fundamental, is also fragile such that we are all, in principle, susceptible to
gaslighting.4
An additional point to be noted here is that the epistemic norm I am
proposing applies primarily to a subject’s ‘global’ or ‘total’ epistemic selftrust. There is nothing epistemically problematic in preferring the deliverances of someone else’s cognitive faculties over one’s own on particular
topics or in well-circumscribed areas (Zagzebski 2012, Ch. 1). Perhaps
someone else’s vision or mathematical abilities are better than my own,
and so I defer to them on these matters. Similarly, it is no threat to epistemic self-trust to rely on credible authorities in areas where one is not an
expert (for most of us, the majority of areas outside of commonsense
and a few other select domains). None of the foregoing are cases where
the norm I have proposed is clearly violated. Further, though I cannot
think of many examples, I would be willing to countenance the possibility
that a subject might permissibly give up epistemic self-trust in some well4

There are two additional issues here. The ﬁrst is that an individual who suﬀers from cognitive defects,
vices, or malfunction may, for this very reason, be unable to appreciate and rationally respond to
even the most signiﬁcant evidence that this is the case bout her (see, e.g. Kornblith 1998). The
second is that there is a kind of paradox involved in an agent who rationally judges and so accepts
that her own cognitive faculties are not trustworthy; after all, shouldn’t this judgement itself now be
untrustworthy? I think that both of these points are important and raise further issues that need to
be addressed, but plead limitations of space here.
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demarcated area for merely prudential reasons (in the absence of any epistemic reasons). Conceding to someone else’s memory of just what happened at the party last night (to the point of genuinely believing their
account is correct) simply because it is easier than the painful argument
that would otherwise follow may not be so problematic.5 Regardless,
the norm I am proposing here is intended to apply to self-trust understood
in a rather global way, as a break-down in one’s conception of one’s ability
to grasp, process, and judge concerning facts in non-specialized ordinary
domains in which large diﬀerences of ability in judgment and knowledge
are atypical or, in any case, where there is no reason to think that they exist
between one’s self and the individual or individuals who are calling one’s
basic grasp of things into question. It is in such cases, the typical cases
where gaslighting occurs, where accepting defeat for one’s self-trust violates the epistemic norm at issue.

6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and
resistance
What can the foregoing account tell us about resistance to gaslighting? On
what grounds might victims of gaslighting, at least in principle, push back?
First, I have argued that the victim ought not concede her epistemic selftrust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons. While the
victim’s personal investment in the gaslighter and the gaslighter’s deployment of manipulative threats may present obstacles to its consistent application, recognition of this principle itself provides signiﬁcant grounds for
resistance. It implies that gaslighting behavior should typically count as
defeating evidence for the credibility of the person engaging in it, excepting only the case where the gaslighter is so skilled at providing his victim
with (fabricated) epistemic reasons for doubting her epistemic self-trust
that an objective assessment of the situation, from her own point of
view (considering the epistemic reasons actually available to her), requires
accepting defeat.
Second, even in such a case, capitulation may not be required, and also
for reasons accessible from the subject’s point of view. Robert Pasnau,
addressing the literature on epistemic peer disagreement, has recently
argued that self-trust is something intrinsically valuable that stands over
5

I am, frankly, inclined to think that it is problematic if the subject goes so far as to form the belief for
merely prudential reasons. It is one thing to decide (for prudential reasons) not to argue about the
matter anymore. It is another to actually change one’s mind. But I don’t need to settle this question
in order to make the point I want to make here about the global norm as it relates to gaslighting.
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against epistemic rationality (which is also intrinsically valuable on his
view) (Pasnau 2015). Pasnau argues that if epistemic rationality were the
only thing agents were concerned about, then some form of conciliationism would seem like the best response to epistemic peer disagreement
across the board. Yet, he argues that conciliationism is problematic
because, at least in certain important cases, it runs up against self-trust,
which requires a certain coherence between one’s beliefs and one’s evidential perspective. Even if my epistemic peer is, from an impartial perspective, equally rational, informed, and etc., from my own perspective
it may be the case that things still seem to me, in light of all available evidence, to be a certain way. Because self-trust is independently valuable,
Pasnau argues, it is at least permissible in such cases to continue to give
my own assessment of the matter and so my own beliefs greater weight
(and thus to lean in the direction of the steadfast approach to peer
disagreement).
While Pasnau’s discussion does not imply that it is reasonable for agents
to give greater weight to their own beliefs no matter what contrary evidence they confront, it does give self-trust particularly great weight in
determining what it is reasonable to believe in cases of peer-disagreement. This is particularly relevant for the victim of gaslighting, insofar as
her situation involves both an epistemic peer-disagreement and a challenge to her self-trust. If Pasnau’s arguments are correct, then it may be
the case not only that an agent should not concede her epistemic
agency for anything other than signiﬁcant epistemic reasons, but also
that even in the face of such reasons, the value of preserving epistemic
self-trust makes it reasonable for her to persist in her own beliefs,
indeed in maintaining trust in herself, even in the face of a certain
amount of evidence to the contrary. Recognizing the way in which the
victim’s experience of gaslighting involves epistemic disagreement thus
opens up, via considerations such as Pasnau’s, avenues for meaningful
and well-grounded resistance.
If the epistemic norm that I have identiﬁed and the potentially defeatoverriding value of self-trust argued for by Pasnau both suggest that resistance to gaslighting will be the rational and justiﬁed response in many
cases, then this raises the question of responsibility when victims capitulate. The account I have oﬀered here does imply that at least some
victims of gaslighting who capitulate to their gaslighters are to some
degree responsible for this capitulation. This will be so when two conditions are met. First, the victim must in fact be in possession of
suﬃcient reasons concerning herself, her gaslighter, and their situation
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that the epistemically reasonable thing to do when confronted with his
gaslighting behavior is to retain her own epistemic self-trust, probably
while downgrading her trust in the gaslighter. Second, the victim must
be psychologically able, at least in principle, to correctly recognize and
process the reasons available to her. In saying this, it may seem that I
am investing the victim of gaslighting with more power and ability to
respond to the situation than she may typically have. Ought implies can,
after all, so saying what a victim ought to do concerning beliefs about
her own self-trust seems moot if the reality of her situation is such that
she is simply overwhelmed and so unable to meaningfully do other
than she does in capitulating. In this connection, Abramson discusses a
signiﬁcant list of ‘tools’ of the gaslighter whereby he attempts to manipulate his victim, such as the victim’s own love for him or the conﬁdence
deﬁcit that many women suﬀer from as a result of social conditioning
and expectations (Abramson 2014, 19–23). I do not mean to downplay
such factors or the diﬃculty of the situation faced by the victim of gaslighting. Nor do I deny that there are cases of gaslighting where rational resistance of the sort I have been describing here is simply not an option for the
victim. Indeed, I think such cases are possible and likely quite frequent.
However, such cases will be cases where at least one of the two conditions
I have identiﬁed is not satisﬁed, and so where the victim who capitulates is
not responsible (or is not fully responsible, depending on the case).
Further, whether the victim who capitulates bears some type of responsibility or not, this in no way diminishes the responsibility of the gaslighter
for the wrong that he is committing against her.
The gaslighter’s goal is to completely neutralize his victim’s conception
of herself as an independent locus of thought and criticism. The fact that,
with the help of additional manipulative strategies or a massive power
imbalance, this goal may be achieved more eﬃciently and with less resistance in some cases does not change the general dynamic at work. Perhaps
social conditions or interpersonal relations are such that some (or even
many) agents start out with epistemic self-trust so fragile that it takes
little (or even nothing?) to successfully gaslight them. This doesn’t show
that gaslighting is not an epistemic phenomenon or that agents are
never responsible for capitulating to gaslighting, but rather that social conditions are such that some (and perhaps many) agents are systematically
prevented from developing or having the epistemic self-trust that they are
rightfully entitled to. In this regard I hope that my extension of the analysis
of gaslighting to its epistemic dimensions might function both as a guide
for what successful resistance to gaslighting might look like (maintaining
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self-trust even in the face of attacks on it by someone one takes to be a
credible peer), and also to more serious consideration of the social conditions and types of character that we should seek to cultivate and
allow to ﬂourish in order to make its use and success less common and
less likely.

7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions
In the foregoing I have extended Abramson’s analysis of gaslighting to
include a fundamental epistemic dimension. I take myself to agree
with the majority of Abramson’s analysis of the characteristic goals,
methods, and moral wrongness of the gaslighter, while disagreeing
with her only in her downplaying of the phenomenon’s essential epistemic dimensions. Yet this disagreement is signiﬁcant. The account on
oﬀer here suggests that Gaslighting involves (i) the attempt by one
person, the gaslighter, to undermine his victim’s self-trust: her conception of herself as an autonomous locus of experience, thought, and
judgment; that the gaslighter’s (ii) motivation is to gain or maintain
control of his victim speciﬁcally by means of getting her to internalize
a view of herself that both neutralizes her ability to criticize him and
ensures her consent to his way of viewing things (speciﬁcally with
regard to issues relevant to the relationship, perhaps in general); that
the gaslighter (iii) pursues this goal by means of a strategy of manipulation, fabrication, and deception that (iv) speciﬁcally relies upon his
victim’s trust in him as a peer or authority in some relevant sense.6
The most distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it is not enough for
the gaslighter simply to control his victim or have things go his way:
it is essential to him that the victim herself actually come to agree
with him. Thus, gaslighting is distinct from mere silencing, from creating
an environment where everyone else believes the victim is wrong, and
also from creating a situation where the victim has no choice but to
acquiesce, even while not agreeing.
So understood, there are four epistemic dimensions to gaslighting. The
ﬁrst is that the gaslighter himself may use a strategy of providing false or
fabricated evidence to his victim in order to undermine her self-trust, as
Gregory does to Paula in the ﬁlm Gas Light. Second, in asserting that his
victim lacks a clear grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is always at
6

Gaslighting is not limited to intimate partners in a relationship. As characterized here, gaslighting is possible in many interpersonal contexts involving trust or authority, such as employee-employer relationships and relationships amongst peers of various sorts (friends, co-workers, fellow students, etc.).
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least tacitly asserting that he has a better grasp, and this is a kind of claim
to epistemic status or authority. Third, from the standpoint of the victim,
gaslighting always places her in a situation of epistemic peer disagreement with her gaslighter, where the point of disagreement is speciﬁcally
whether her own cognitive faculties are reliable or not, and she must
weigh her trust in the gaslighter and associated evidence for this
against her own self-trust. Fourth, and ﬁnally, self-trust is a fundamental
epistemic value and the condition of all other meaningful epistemic
agency, thus an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust on anything but epistemic grounds. The agent who capitulates to gaslighting for
merely prudential or moral reasons thus violates a fundamental epistemic
norm. While there may be agents for whom no possibility of resistance to
gaslighting exists, the foregoing account still helps to make clear what
meaningful resistance, where possible, might look like, and also points
to the project of articulating the social and interpersonal conditions
under which legitimate self-trust might ﬂourish, thus minimizing the
occurrence or possibility of successful gaslighting.
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